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Stimuli were presented in which values of an outcome variable for a single individual were recorded over
24 time periods, and an intervention was introduced at one of the time periods. Participants judged
whether and how much the intervention affected the outcome. Judgements were affected by manipula-
tions of the temporal relation between the intervention and a gradual increase in values on the outcome
variable, by the size of the increase, by the time taken for the increase to occur, and by variance in the
preincrease data. Most results were predicted by a simple model in which the mean outcome value for
the preintervention time periods is subtracted from the mean outcome value for the postintervention
time periods, though there was also an effect of temporal contiguity that is not predicted by the
simple model. This form of information, which is a kind of quasiexperimental design, is more repre-
sentative of the kind of information generally available for causal judgement than the more commonly
investigated binary variables in which the cause is either present or absent, and the outcome either
occurs or does not; as such, it is more revealing of how causal judgements are made under the conditions
that prevail in the world.
Keywords: Causal judgement; Quasiexperimental design.
Causal judgements about temporal sequences
of events in single individuals
Some years ago I suffered a back injury and saw a
physiotherapist. The physiotherapist was at ﬁrst
unwilling to treat me because we did not have a
diagnosis. While waiting for a diagnosis, for
several months, my condition did not improve.
When the diagnosis arrived, the physiotherapist
started me on some exercises. During that period,
my condition improved slowly but steadily, again
over a period of many months. As a result of that,
I acquired a belief that the physiotherapy exercises
played a causal role in my improvement. An
article in New Scientist magazine reviewed the
use of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
to treat patients in a persistent vegetative state.
Discussing one such patient, the article said:
He had only been given a 20 to 40 per cent chance of long-term
recovery, and until he was given TMS his functioning had not
improved since about four months after the accident. What’s
more, after the 15th TMS session, he improved incrementally
with each session—further evidence that TMS was the cause.
(Geddes, 2008, p. 9)
What these anecdotes have in common is the
observation of incremental change from an estab-
lished baseline, temporally associated with an inter-
vention, with a single participant. Causal inferences
from such data cannot be scientiﬁcally justiﬁed, for
two obvious reasons. First, the data come from a
sample of one. Except in rare cases where there is
essentially zero variance in a population, causal
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inferences require large samples of observations.
Testing the efﬁcacy of physiotherapy exercises, for
example, would require a large sample of patients
with similar injuries performing similar exercises.
Second, the data constitute, at best, a quasiexperi-
mental design with no control group. Many other
factors temporally correlated with the intervention
could be responsible for the change, and the data
provide no means of ruling any of them out
(Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Despite this, causal inferences from such data
are peculiarly persuasive, as I can testify from my
own experience. I suspect that inferences of this
kind are commonly made by laypeople. Probably
most of us, for example, see some of our adult
characteristics, habits, fears, and predilections as
outcomes of events or extended occurrences in
our early lives. We may trace incremental changes
in health-related factors to changes in our diet, or
improvement in our mental state to the adoption
of an exercise programme. All of these kinds of
causal inferences suffer from the same methodo-
logical inadequacies: We have a sample of one,
and we cannot run a control condition. We do
not know what our sample of one would have
been like in the absence of the intervention.
Laypeople do not have the opportunities that scien-
tists have to collect large amounts of data under
controlled experimental manipulations. The
activity of causal inference in everyday life is inevi-
tably methodologically ﬂawed. If we want to make
causal inferences about ourselves at all, we have no
choice but to accept whatever data we can get.
Laboratory investigations of human causal infer-
ence have paid little attention to issues of the meth-
odological adequacy of data that can be obtained
under the conditions of everyday life. There have
been many studies, for example, of causal inference
from information about empirical associations
between binary variables (Allan, 1993; De
Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Hattori & Oaksford,
2007; Perales & Shanks, 2007). These are variables
with two values: The cause in question may be
present or absent, and the outcome may occur or
not. Stimulus presentations are designed with at
least a moderate sample of observations, and with
information about what happens when the cause
of interest is absent as well as what happens when
it is present. The cause-absent information is
usually presented in such a way as to constitute a
methodologically appropriate control condition.
These methodological features are employed in
part because data from them can be analysed with
normative inferential procedures, yielding either
objective contingencies (Jenkins & Ward, 1965;
McKenzie, 1994; Ward & Jenkins, 1965) or, so it
has been claimed, normative causal analyses
(Cheng, 1997; Grifﬁths & Tenenbaum, 2005,
2009; Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; Lu, Yuille,
Liljeholm, Cheng, & Holyoak, 2008).
In everyday life it would be impractical to forgo
causal inference on grounds of methodological or
informational imperfections; it is surely more
likely that causal judgement is suited to the imper-
fect conditions of life than to the idealized con-
ditions of the scientiﬁc laboratory. How do
people make causal inferences under such con-
ditions? In the present research, I attempt to shed
some light on this by looking at the case described
earlier: single instances with information about
change over a series of time periods, associated
with speciﬁc interventions. This is just one
among many possible forms of data that may be
available in the world, but I suggest that it is one
of the more important for human causal judgement,
not least because it relates to the problem of making
self-relevant causal inferences.
There are several factors that could inﬂuence
causal judgements in the kind of situation investi-
gated here. The most obvious is temporal associ-
ation. Many studies have shown that temporal
cues are involved in causal inferences by children
and adults and sometimes override other cues such
as objective contingencies (Bühner & May, 2002,
2003, 2004; Bühner & McGregor, 2006; Greville
& Buehner, 2007; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006;
Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Rottman & Keil,
2012; Schlottmann, 1999; Shultz & Kestenbaum,
1985; Siegler, 1975; Siegler & Liebert, 1974;
White, 1988, 2006). The use of temporal infor-
mation tends to interact with mechanism beliefs.
If people believe that a mechanism connecting a
cause to an outcome takes a certain amount of
time to operate, they tend not to identify a
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temporally proximal event as the cause if they
believe there is insufﬁcient time for the mechanism
to operate (Bühner & McGregor, 2006). In the
absence of relevant mechanism beliefs, the research
cited above shows that temporal contiguity (along
with temporal order) is a strong cue to causal infer-
ence. However, none of the studies has considered
causal inference from a time series design concern-
ing a single entity with no control condition.
Another possibly relevant factor is change mag-
nitude. Incremental change is not a binary variable.
I can assess the amount of improvement in my
back, for example, compared to a baseline (e.g.,
the state it was in just before treatment started),
and I can assess how that amount changes as time
progresses. Change magnitude has received much
less attention in causal judgement research than
contingency information has, but there are indi-
cations that causal judgement is inﬂuenced by
outcome magnitude information from an early
age. In the ﬁrst year of life, infants have expec-
tations about the relation between the size of an
object and the magnitude of outcome it should
produce, and they are surprised when those expec-
tations are violated (Kotovsky & Baillargeon,
1998). This suggests that, from an early age, we
operate with a simple rule relating the strength of
a cause to the magnitude of the outcome: The
stronger the cause, the greater the outcome.
Evidence consistent with the use of this rule has
been reported (diSessa, 1993). If this is the case,
then the amount of change in the value of a variable
may be taken as an indicator of causal strength.
With incremental changes, two dimensions of
change magnitude can be distinguished. One is
the amount of change that occurs, either in absolute
terms or relative to a baseline. An improvement of
50% in my back might make a more persuasive case
for the efﬁcacy of physiotherapy than an improve-
ment of 25% would. The other is the slope of the
improvement function. This means, in effect, the
amount of time it takes to reach a given value of
outcome magnitude. If we suppose, for the sake
of simplicity, that the function is linear, then an
improvement of 50% in three months is likely to
be more persuasive than an improvement of 50%
in six months.
Experiment 1 was therefore designed to investi-
gate effects of temporal association, amount of
change, and slope of the improvement function.
Participants are told that scientists are monitoring
the level of cells of a particular kind in the human
bloodstream, and theywant to seewhether this quan-
tity is affected by a chemical injected into the blood.
The patient’s blood is sampled once an hour for
24 hours. So there is information about each of
24 consecutive time periods. Each time period pre-
sents a record of the quantity of cells counted, and
the point at which the intervention (the injection) is
made is also indicated. This design is called a
simple interrupted time series (Cook & Campbell,
1979), where the intervention is the interruption.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 incorporated two experimental
designs, hereafter Experiments 1a and 1b, in a
single set of stimulus materials with the same
sample of participants. In all, therewere 20 individual
judgemental problems, hereafter called datasets. The
design of Experiment 1a incorporated 16 of these.
The design of Experiment 1b incorporated four of
those in theExperiment 1adesign and four additional
datasets. Some data, therefore, enter the analyses for
both designs. Order of presentation of datasets was
randomized independently for each participant.
EXPERIMENT 1A
Method
Participants
The participants were 39 ﬁrst-year undergraduate
students of psychology with English as their ﬁrst
language. They received course credit for their par-
ticipation. None had been taught any psychology of
relevance to this topic.
Stimulus materials
The materials comprised an initial instruction sheet
and 16 datasets. The initial instructions read as
follows:
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The human bloodstream contains many different kinds of cells.
Scientists are trying to ﬁnd out what inﬂuences levels of these
cells in the blood. They are testing the hypothesis that certain
chemicals may have an effect on these cells. To test this, they
monitor the level of a given kind of cell in the blood over a
period of time; some time during that period they inject a chemi-
cal into the bloodstream to see what effect it has, if any.
On the following pages you will see data for a series of
experimental trials of this sort. Each page concerns a different
kind of cell and a different kind of chemical, each identiﬁed
with a two-letter code. The data concern a single patient,
identiﬁed by a number. The patient’s blood is sampled once
every hour for 24 hours, and the level of the cells in the
patient’s blood in each of these samples is given, in millilitres
per litre of blood. So you will see two columns of information.
The left-hand column just numbers the hours, in chronologi-
cal order. The right-hand column gives the level of cells
recorded for each hour. At some point during this sampling
period the chemical in question is injected into the patient’s
blood. The data tell you at what point this was done on
each page.
At the bottom of the page you will see two questions. The
ﬁrst question asks you whether the chemical causes an increase
in the level of the cells in the patient’s blood or not. You just
answer yes or no to this. If you answer yes, then you go on to
the second question. This asks you to rate how strong a cause
of increase the chemical is. You should answer this question by
writing a number from 1 to 100 beside it. 1 means that the
chemical is a very weak cause of increase in the cells, and
100 means that it is a very strong cause of increase in the
cells. The stronger you think the chemical is as a cause of
increase in the cells, the higher the number you should put,
up to a maximum of 100.
Following this were 20 datasets, each presented on
a separate page, and each with the same format.
Sixteen of these constituted the materials for
Experiment 1a, and the other four, together with
four of the Experiment 1a datasets, constituted
the materials for Experiment 1b. At the top of
each page the chemical and the cell type were ident-
iﬁed with two-letter codes, and the patient was
identiﬁed with a number. Each page had different
identiﬁers, to make it clear that each dataset was
independent of the others. Under that were the
columns of information as described above. At
the appropriate point the sentence “chemical
injected here”, in block capitals, was inserted
between adjacent time periods. At the bottom of
the page were the two questions, as described
above.
The datasets are all shown in Table 1. Each
column is a dataset, and the headings identify the
values of each of the independent variables. The
location of the intervention is indicated with an
asterisk. In all datasets, readings in the ﬁrst six
time periods alternated between 15 and 16. That
is the baseline phase. At time period 7 an incre-
mental change began. That is the increase phase.
The duration of the increase phase varied depend-
ing on whether the rate of increase was shallow (11
time periods) or steep (6 time periods). Once the
peak value was reached, the remaining readings
oscillated between that value and one lower. That
is the postincrease phase.
Design
Three variables were manipulated, all within sub-
jects. The timing of the intervention was manipu-
lated. The intervention could occur three time
periods before the start of the increase (“early”), in
the time period where the increase began (“on
time”; the location lies between time periods 6
and 7), midway between the beginning and the
end of the increase (“midway”; the exact point of
this depends on the duration of the increase
phase), and in the time period where the increase
ended (“late”; the exact point of this also depends
on the duration of the increase phase).
Amount of increase, operationalized as the
difference between the levels in the last and ﬁrst
of the increase periods, was manipulated with two
values, small (5) and large (10). Rate of increase,
operationalized as the duration of the increase
phase, was manipulated with two values, shallow
(11 time periods) and steep (6 time periods). The
design was therefore 4× 2× 2, totalling 16
datasets.
Procedure
Participants took part in small groups, supervised
by an experimenter. The questionnaire for this
experiment was included among a set of materials
for experiments on unrelated topics. Participants
were told that they should ask questions if anything
in the instructions was not clear. None had any
questions about the materials for this experiment.
Participants then proceeded through the tasks at
their own pace. At the end of the session, partici-
pants were given course credit and debriefed
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about the general aims of the research, but not
about the speciﬁc hypotheses being tested.
Results
For purposes of analysis, “no” responses to the ﬁrst
question were treated as ratings of zero. Data were
analysed with a 4 (timing of intervention: early vs.
on time vs. midway vs. late)× 2 (amount of
increase: small vs. large)× 2 (rate of increase:
shallow vs. steep) within-subjects analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA). The Tukey test was used for
post hoc paired comparisons in this and subsequent
experiments. Means for the 16 datasets are pre-
sented in Table 2. There were signiﬁcant effects
of all three variables.
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of timing,
F(3, 114)= 15.06, MSE= 416.37, p, .001,
h2p = .28. Post hoc paired comparisons revealed a
signiﬁcantly lower mean for late intervention
(10.44) than for early (22.39), on-time (24.71),
and midway intervention (21.30), which did not
differ signiﬁcantly.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 38)= 49.89, MSE= 825.37,
p, .001, h2p = .57, with a higher mean for large
(27.83) than for small (11.59). There was a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of rate of increase, F(1, 38)=
30.97, MSE= 112.27, p, .001, h2p = .45, with a
higher mean for steep rate (22.07) than for
shallow rate (17.35).
These effects were qualiﬁed by two signiﬁcant
two-way interactions. There was a signiﬁcant inter-
action between timing and rate of increase, F(3,
114)= 5.62, MSE= 119.06, p, .01, h2p = .13.
The main feature of the interaction is that there
Table 1. The 16 datasets used in Experiment 1a
Period
e/s/
sh
e/s/
st
e/l/
sh
e/l/
st
o/s/
sh
o/s/
st
o/l/
sh
o/l/
st
m/s/
sh
m/s/
st
m/l/
sh
m/l/
st
l/s/
sh
l/s/
st
l/l/
sh
l/l/
st
1 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
2 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
3 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
4 15* 15* 15* 15* 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
5 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
6 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
7 17 17 17 17 17* 17* 17* 17* 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
8 17 18 18 19 17 18 18 19 17 18 18 19 17 18 18 19
9 18 19 19 21 18 19 19 21 18 19 19 21 18 19 19 21
10 18 20 20 23 18 20 20 23 18 20* 20 23* 18 20 20 23
11 19 21 21 25 19 21 21 25 19 21 21 25 19 21 21 25
12 19 22 22 27 19 22 22 27 19 22 22 27 19 22* 22 27*
13 20 21 23 26 20 21 23 26 20* 21 23* 26 20 21 23 26
14 20 22 24 27 20 22 24 27 20 22 24 27 20 22 24 27
15 21 21 25 26 21 21 25 26 21 21 25 26 21 21 25 26
16 21 22 26 27 21 22 26 27 21 22 26 27 21 22 26 27
17 22 21 27 26 22 21 27 26 22 21 27 26 22* 21 27* 26
18 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27
19 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26
20 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27
21 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26
22 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27
23 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26 21 21 26 26
24 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22 27 27
Note: Columns are identiﬁed by values of independent variables in the order timing/magnitude/rate. For timing, “e”= early, “o”= on
time, “m”=midway, and “l”= late. For amount of increase, “s”= small and “l”= large. For rate of increase, “sh”= shallow and
“st”= steep. Locations of interventions are indicated by asterisks.
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was no signiﬁcant effect of rate of increase with the
early intervention, F(1, 38)= 0.58,MSE= 108.75.
However, perhaps the most noteworthy feature is
that the effect of rate of increase was signiﬁcant at
the late intervention, F(1, 38)= 7.79, MSE=
191.95, p, .01, h2p = .17. Thus, even when the
intervention occurred at a point where the increase
phase had ended, causal judgements were still sig-
niﬁcantly higher if the increase had been steep
than if it had been shallow. The causal question
speciﬁcally asked whether the chemical caused an
increase or not, so this cannot be interpreted as a
judgement that the chemical halted an increase
that had been in progress.
The other signiﬁcant interaction was between
amount of increase and rate of increase, F(1,
38)= 4.66, MSE= 104.41, p, .05, h2p = .11.
There were signiﬁcant effects in accord with the
respective main effects in all comparisons. The
effect of rate of increase was greater when the
amount of increase was large than when it was
small.
Discussion
If judgements were guided by a principle of tem-
poral contiguity, the highest causal judgements
should have been found for the on-time interven-
tion, which occurred at the start of the increase
phase and was therefore temporally contiguous
with the start of the increase. In fact, means for
the on-time, early, and midway interventions
were not signiﬁcantly different. The result for the
early intervention is not unduly surprising. People
may be familiar with the idea that different drugs
can take differing amounts of time to produce a
noticeable effect (from seconds or minutes to
weeks or months), so an effect delayed by a few
hours may not be incompatible with their mechan-
ism beliefs. The result for the midway intervention
is rather more unexpected.
The midway intervention occurs midway
through the increase phase: A noticeable increase
has been underway for some hours and continues
at the same rate for some more hours after the
intervention. The intervention cannot have been
responsible for initiating this increase, and there
is no evidence that it changes the rate of increase.
In short, there is no objective evidence that the
midway intervention has any effect. Yet it was
rated as high as the on-time intervention. It could
be objected that the occurrence of an increase
may not be clear halfway through the increase
phase. If participants are detecting a signal
amongst the noise of natural ﬂuctuation in a depen-
dent measure, perhaps the signal is not detectable
until after the halfway mark in the increase phase.
A glance at Table 1 is sufﬁcient to refute that argu-
ment. In the baseline phase the count never varies
by more than one for six consecutive time
periods. In datasets with large amount of increase,
the midway intervention occurs at a point where
the count has risen by 5 from the ﬁrst reading in
the increase phase, and by 7 from the last reading
in the baseline phase, in steady increments of 1 in
the shallow rate datasets and of 2 in the steep rate
datasets. It is surely not difﬁcult to detect such an
increase against a background of almost no vari-
ation. Nor is it difﬁcult to detect that the rate of
increase does not change after the midway
Table 2. Mean causal judgements and numbers of participants
responding “yes” to Question 1, Experiments 1a, 2a, and 3a
Experiment
Timing Amount Rate 1a 2a 3a
Early Small Shallow 14.3 (30) 21.0 20.8 (34)
Steep 13.0 (28) 19.73 1.3 (35)
Large Shallow 31.7 (35) 40.34 8.6 (36)
Steep 30.5 (34) 38.75 5.7 (39)
On time Small Shallow 11.8 (32) 28.3 19.9 (37)
Steep 17.6 (36) 24.0 37.7 (39)
Large Shallow 31.8 (36) 44.2 64.0 (40)
Steep 37.5 (38) 41.7 61.9 (39)
Midway Small Shallow 10.6 (28) 15.5 3.5 (11)
Steep 16.7 (33) 15.9 3.2 (8)
Large Shallow 23.7 (30) 26.2 11.2 (12)
Steep 34.1 (36) 35.6 10.2 (8)
Late Small Shallow 3.6 (13) 7.8 1.4 (4)
Steep 4.9 (12) 9.6 1.9 (4)
Large Shallow 11.1 (17) 13.8 5.4 (4)
Steep 22.1 (34) 15.7 4.1 (4)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are numbers of participants
responding “yes” to Question 1 (Experiments 1a and 3a
only). For Experiment 1a, n= 39. For Experiment 3a,
n= 40.
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intervention, until the end of the increase phase.
Participants identiﬁed an intervention as a cause
of something that had unambiguously already
started to happen before the intervention occurred.
It could be argued that the means were low—for
the large amount of increase, between 30 and 40 on
the 101-point scale—so most participants did not
regard the chemical as a cause of the increase.
However, the means were just as low for the on-
time intervention. Whatever factors determine the
generally low level of judgement, they apply
equally to the on-time and midway interventions.
More importantly, although the means were low,
most participants did identify the chemical as a
cause of the increase (see Table 2). For example,
for the combination of midway intervention, large
amount of increase, and steep rate of increase,
only three participants (8%) responded “no” to
the causal question. That is, more than 90% of par-
ticipants identiﬁed the midway intervention as
causal in that dataset.
There were, as predicted, signiﬁcant effects of
both amount and rate of increase. It was argued
that both factors are indicators of the strength of
causes, and the results are consistent with this
reasoning. It is difﬁcult to draw causal inferences
with any conﬁdence from data concerning a
sample of one and lacking a control group. One
way of dealing with these methodological imperfec-
tions is to rely on multiple cues to causality. If con-
tingency alone is not a reliable guide, the
conjunction of contingency, temporal contiguity,
and outcome magnitude (both amount and rate of
change), perhaps combined with the lack of explicit
alternative causes (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986)
might make a subjectively more compelling case.
Why were the means low? The strong effect of
amount of increase indicates that this could be
the key factor. From a baseline mean of 15.5, the
level rises only to 22 when the amount of increase
is small and 27 when it is large. The respective
means for these were 11.59 and 27.83. This indi-
cates that a greater amount of increase, say to 47,
would be likely to result in substantially higher jud-
gement. It is also possible that a smaller baseline
mean, say of 1.5, would result in higher judgement.
An increase of 10 from a baseline of 1.5 is a 667%
increase in the count, whereas an increase of 10
from a baseline of 15.5 is only a 65% increase.
Percentage increase in the outcome could be a sig-
niﬁcant determinant of a judgement of causal
strength. This will be tested in Experiment 4.
EXPERIMENT 1B
The design for Experiment 1a included both an
unambiguous increase phase and a plateau in the
postincrease phase, so that there was a substantial
and consistent difference between baseline phase
and postincrease phase readings. It might be
thought that the occurrence of an unambiguous
increase over a series of successive time periods is
sufﬁcient for causal inference, but in Experiment 1a
this increase was confounded with the plateau
state of the postincrease phase, and either could
be important. In Experiment 1b the plateau was
compared with a postincrease phase in which read-
ings gradually declined to the baseline level.
Speciﬁcally, four of the datasets from the design
for Experiment 1a were compared with four data-
sets that were similar except for the occurrence of
a decline in the postincrease phase.
Method
The method was similar to that in Experiment 1a,
except for the design. The steep rate condition of
Experiment 1a was used in all datasets here. Three
variables were manipulated. Timing of intervention
was manipulated with two of the conditions from
Experiment 1a: early and on time. Amount of
increase was manipulated with the same two values
as those in Experiment 1a: small and large. The
increase phase began in time period 7 and ended
in time period 12. Following this, readings either
remained at the same level, as in Experiment 1a,
or declined to the baseline level. This decline was
complete by time period 19, and readings remained
at the baseline level (varying by one, as in the baseline
period) until the end at time period 24. This con-
dition is called the decline. The postincrease phase
therefore had two conditions: plateau (four datasets
from Experiment 1a) and decline. This was a
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within-subjects manipulation. These manipulations
yielded a total of eight datasets.
Result
Data were analysed with a 2 (timing of interven-
tion: early vs. on time)× 2 (amount of increase:
small vs. large)× 2 (postincrease phase: plateau
vs. decline) within-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Means are reported in Table 3.
The main ﬁnding of interest was a strong main
effect of postincrease phase, F(1, 38)= 38.45,
MSE= 426.17, p, .001, h2p = .50, with a higher
mean for the plateau (24.66) than for the decline
(10.17).
There was a signiﬁcantmain effect of timing,F(1,
38)= 5.82,MSE= 114.03, p, .05, h2p = .13, with
a higher mean for the on-time intervention (18.87)
than for the early intervention (15.96). This was qua-
liﬁed by a signiﬁcant two-way interaction with post-
increase phase, F(1, 38)= 8.59, MSE= 75.90,
p, .01, h2p = .18. This showed that the effect of
timing was restricted to the plateau, F(1, 38)=
12.61, MSE= 104.31, p, .001, h2p = .25, with a
higher mean for the on-time intervention (27.56)
than for the early intervention (21.76). There was
no signiﬁcant effect for the decline, F(1, 38)=
0.00,MSE= 85.62.
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 38)= 44.58, MSE= 299.48,
p, .001, h2p = .54, with a higher mean for large
(23.96) than for small (10.87). This was qualiﬁed
by a signiﬁcant two-way interaction with
postincrease phase, F(1, 38)= 11.15, MSE=
219.09, p, .01, h2p = .23. There were signiﬁcant
effects in accord with the directions of the respect-
ive main effects in all analyses. It is likely that the
interaction represents a ﬂoor effect, with the size
of the differences noticeably reduced for means
closer to the ﬂoor of the scale. This can be seen
in Table 3. There were no other signiﬁcant results.
Discussion
Replacing the plateau with a decline in the postin-
crease phase resulted in signiﬁcantly lower causal jud-
gements. In the decline datasets, Table 3 shows that
in all cases more than half of the participants judged
that the intervention was a cause of the change,
even though the mean judged change was low. It
may be that sustained improvement is necessary for
an intervention to be judged a strong cause, though
not necessary for it to be judged a weak cause.
Experiment 4 was designed to investigate this
further by manipulating the time of onset of the
decline. Experiment 4 was also designed to test the
possibility raised in the discussion of Experiment 1a
that the low ratings could be attributed in part to
the high baseline value. In Experiment 4, low and
high baseline values were used.
Discussion of Experiments 1a and 1b
The ﬁrst issue to consider is howmuch the results of
Experiment 1 owe to the method used. The depen-
dentmeasure asked participants,ﬁrst, to saywhether
Table 3. Mean causal judgements and numbers of participants responding “yes” to Question 1, Experiments 1b, 2b, and 3b
Experiment
Timing Amount Postincrease 1b 2b 3b
Early Small Plateau 13.0 (28) 19.7 31.3 (35)
Decline 6.5 (20) 16.3 18.8 (26)
Large Plateau 30.5 (34) 38.7 55.7 (39)
Decline 13.8 (26) 27.2 36.0 (29)
On time Small Plateau 17.6 (36) 23.9 37.7 (39)
Decline 6.4 (23) 18.4 29.4 (30)
Large Plateau 37.5 (38) 41.7 61.9 (39)
Decline 14.0 (26) 26.0 42.1 (32)
2156 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2015, 68 (11)
WHITE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
4:3
7 0
8 A
ug
us
t 2
01
6 
the interventionwas a cause of increase in the level of
cells in the patient’s blood or not and, second, how
strong a cause of increase they think the intervention
was. It could be argued that this form of words is
ambiguous. It could be taken as referring to themag-
nitude and rate of change that occurs after the inter-
vention, or as a measure of conﬁdence that the
intervention did make a difference. If participants
treated it as a measure of their conﬁdence in their
judgement that the intervention made a difference,
that could explain the generally low mean ratings
as showing some awareness of the uncertainties in
the information. Experiment 2 was designed to
test this by using a wording of the dependent
measure that could not be interpreted as a conﬁ-
dence rating: a single question worded, “To what
extent does the intervention cause an increase in
the level of cells in the patient’s blood?”.
The stimulus information in Experiment 1 was
presented in numerical form. It could be argued
that people rarely have to make judgements about
a series of numbers in everyday life. Experiences
such as levels of pain are rarely registered numeri-
cally, although people may still have an appreciation
of how the magnitude of the variable changes over
time: They might say that they feel a bit more pain
today than yesterday, for example. An alternative
way of presenting magnitude information is in the
form of a graph. Although people rarely have to
make judgements about graphical information in
everyday life, it could be argued that graphs
present magnitude and change information more
directly, and that this might therefore engage differ-
ent processes perhaps closer to those of everyday life.
Experiment 3was designed to test this by presenting
the same stimulus information as that in
Experiment 1 but in the form of graphs.
EXPERIMENT 2
EXPERIMENT 2A
Method
The method was exactly the same as that in
Experiment 1, except for the following differences.
There were 40 participants, none of whom had par-
ticipated in Experiment 1. The dependent measure
used in Experiment 1 was replaced with a single
question: “To what extent does [the chemical]
cause an increase in the level of [the cells] in [the
patient’s] blood?”.
Result
Data were analysed with a 4 (timing of interven-
tion: early vs. on time vs. midway vs. late)× 2
(amount of increase: small vs. large)× 2 (rate of
increase: shallow vs. steep) within-subjects
ANOVA. The Tukey test was used for post hoc
paired comparisons. Means for the 16 datasets are
presented in Table 2. In brief, there were signiﬁcant
effects of timing of intervention and of amount of
increase that resembled the corresponding results
of Experiment 1a, but the effect of rate of increase
was not signiﬁcant.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of timing of inter-
vention, F(3, 117)= 49.31, MSE= 318.96,
p, .001, h2p = .56. Post hoc paired comparisons
revealed a signiﬁcantly lower mean for late inter-
vention (11.74) than for early (29.96), on-time
(34.57), and midway (23.29) intervention. The
mean for the midway intervention was signiﬁcantly
lower than those for early and on time, which did
not differ signiﬁcantly.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 39)= 74.00, MSE= 442.16,
p, .001, h2p = .65, with a higher mean for large
(32.04) than for small (17.74). The effect of rate
of increase was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 39)= 0.27,
MSE= 153.53.
These effects were qualiﬁed by two signiﬁcant
interactions. There was a signiﬁcant interaction
between timing of intervention and amount of
increase, F(3, 117)= 7.17, MSE= 182.83,
p, .001, h2p = .16. Simple effects analysis revealed
signiﬁcant effects in accordance with the respective
main effects in all cases. The interaction shows that
the effect of amount of increase tended to weaken
as the timing of the intervention became later. It
was, however, still signiﬁcant even at late interven-
tion (p, .01).
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There was also a signiﬁcant interaction between
timing and rate of increase, F(3, 117)= 3.11,
MSE= 174.30, p, .05, h2p = .07. Simple effects
analysis revealed signiﬁcant effects of timing of
intervention at both values of rate of increase, and
these resembled the main effect. There was a sig-
niﬁcant effect of rate of increase at midway inter-
vention, F(1, 39)= 5.41, MSE= 180.37, p, .05,
h2p = .12, with a higher mean at steep (25.76)
than at shallow (20.82). This is the direction of
difference found in the main effect of rate of
increase in Experiment 1a. There were no other
signiﬁcant effects of rate of increase here.
EXPERIMENT 2B
Method
The method was exactly the same as that in
Experiment 2a.
Result
Data were analysed with a 2 (timing of interven-
tion: early vs. on time)× 2 (amount of increase:
small vs. large)× 2 (postincrease phase: plateau
vs. decline) within-subjects ANOVA. Means are
reported in Table 3. In brief, there were signiﬁcant
effects of amount of increase and postincrease
phase, which resembled those found in
Experiment 1b. The effect of timing of interven-
tion was not signiﬁcant, though the difference
between the means was in the same direction and
similar in magnitude.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 39)= 52.71, MSE= 291.38,
p, .001, h2p = .57, with a higher mean for large
increase (33.44) than for small (19.58). There was
also a signiﬁcant effect of postincrease phase, F(1,
39)= 16.55, MSE= 397.46, p, .001, h2p = .30 ,
with a higher mean for plateau (31.04) than for
decline (21.97).
These two effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant
interaction, F(1, 39)= 9.80, MSE= 169.40,
p, .01, h2p = .20. There were signiﬁcant effects
in accord with the directions of the main effects
in all analyses. The pattern resembles that found
in the corresponding interaction in Experiment
1b. There were no other signiﬁcant results.
Discussion
Most of the results of Experiment 2 replicated
those of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2a there
were effects of timing of intervention and amount
of increase that resembled the corresponding
results of Experiment 1a. In Experiment 2b there
were signiﬁcant effects of amount of increase and
postincrease phase that resembled the correspond-
ing results of Experiment 1b. The signiﬁcant inter-
action between amount of increase and postincrease
phase also resembled that found in Experiment 1b.
It is noteworthy that the means tended to be low in
this experiment, not obviously different from those
found in Experiment 1. This suggests that the low
means in Experiment 1 indicate genuine judge-
ments of causal strength and not ratings of conﬁ-
dence that there is a causal relation. It is also
noteworthy that most participants gave nonzero
judgements to the late interventions, as in
Experiment 1a. Thus, even though ratings of late
interventions tended to be low, the late intervention
was still regarded as causal.
Some differences in results should be noted. In
Experiment 2a, the mean for the midway interven-
tion was signiﬁcantly lower than those for the early
and on-time interventions, which was not the case
in Experiment 1a. On the other hand, in
Experiment 2b there was no signiﬁcant difference
between the early and on-time interactions,
whereas there was such an effect in Experiment
1b. It seems plausible that there are weak effects
of timing between the early, on-time, and
midway interventions that reach statistical signiﬁ-
cance on some occasions and not on others. In
Experiment 2a there was a signiﬁcant effect of
rate of increase only at the midway intervention,
whereas the main effect of rate of increase was sig-
niﬁcant in Experiment 1a. Some details of inter-
actions differed as well.
In conclusion, the hypothesis that judgements
were affected by the wording of the dependent
measure cannot be rejected because the results
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were not precisely identical, but the similarities are
such as to suggest that the manipulation of wording
has not completely transformed the process of
judgement.
EXPERIMENT 3
EXPERIMENT 3A
Method
The method of Experiment 3 was exactly the same
as that in Experiment 1, with the following excep-
tions. There were 40 participants, none of whom
had participated in either of the previous exper-
iments. Instead of numerical presentation, graphi-
cal presentation was used. Time periods were
indicated on the x-axis and level of cells on the
y-axis. The readings were presented as a line
graph. The timing of the intervention was indicated
by a vertical line drawn through the graph in the
appropriate place. A sentence underneath each
graph reminded participants that the vertical line
marked the time of the intervention.
The instructions were modiﬁed accordingly.
The passage referring to the columns of infor-
mation (the latter part of the second paragraph of
the instructions) was replaced with the following:
You will see this information in the form of a graph. The time
periods from 1 to 24 are indicated along the bottom and
the level of cells up the side of the graph. The line across the
graph from period 1 to period 24 shows how the level of the
cells in question changed for that patient over the 24 time
periods. A vertical line drawn on the graph from top to
bottom shows you the time at which the chemical was injected.
Apart from that, the instructions were the same as
those in Experiment 1. An example stimulus pres-
entation is shown in Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows the
on-time intervention, large amount, and shallow
rate of increase presentation.
Result
Data were analysed with a 4 (timing of interven-
tion: early vs. on time vs. midway vs. late)× 2
(amount of increase: small vs. large)× 2 (rate of
increase: shallow vs. steep) within-subjects
ANOVA. The Tukey test was used for post hoc
paired comparisons. Means for the 16 datasets are
presented in Table 2. In brief, there were signiﬁcant
effects of all variables that resembled those found in
Experiment 1a, except that the means for the
midway and late interventions were much lower
than those for the early and on-time interventions.
All four interactions were statistically signiﬁcant.
The main effects are reported ﬁrst.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of timing of inter-
vention, F(3, 117)= 137.37, MSE= 553.98,
p, .001, h2p = .78. Post hoc paired comparisons
showed that the means for the early (39.11) and
on-time (45.88) interventions, which did not
differ signiﬁcantly, were signiﬁcantly higher than
those for the midway (7.06) and late (3.19) inter-
ventions, which did not differ signiﬁcantly.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 39)= 159.87, MSE= 312.87,
p, .001, h2p = .80 , with a higher mean for large
(32.65) than for small (14.97) increase. There was
a signiﬁcant effect of rate of increase, F(1, 39)=Figure 1. Example stimulus presentation, Experiment 3.
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12.63, MSE= 196.39, p, .001, h2p = .24 , with a
higher mean for steep (25.78) than for shallow
(21.84) increase.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between
timing of intervention and amount of increase,
F(3, 117)= 53.65, MSE= 163.71, p, .001,
h2p = .58. This interaction reﬂects the greatly
reduced judgements of the midway and late inter-
ventions. Thus, there were strong effects of amount
of increase for early intervention, F(1, 39)=
100.06, MSE= 273.10, p, .001, h2p = .72, and
for on-time intervention, F(1, 39)= 287.88,
MSE= 161.45, p, .001, h2p = .88, both in accord-
ance with the main effect. The effect of amount of
increase at midway intervention was signiﬁcant but
smaller, and again in the direction of the main
effect, F(1, 39)= 10.52, MSE= 206.71, p, .01,
h2p = .21, but the effect of amount of increase at
late intervention was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 39)=
2.40, MSE= 162.74.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between
timing of intervention and rate of increase, F(3,
117)= 5.45, MSE= 193.88, p, .01, h2p = .12.
Here too the interaction reﬂects the low judge-
ments of the midway and late interventions.
There were strong effects of rate of increase for
early intervention, F(1, 39)= 16.36, MSE=
193.16, p, .001, h2p = .30, and for on-time inter-
vention, F(1, 39)= 8.55, MSE= 289.26, p, .01,
h2p = .18, both in the direction of the main effect.
However, there was no signiﬁcant effect of rate of
increase for either midway intervention, F(1,
39)= 0.10, MSE= 160.18, or late intervention,
F(1, 39)= 0.04, MSE= 135.43.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between
amount and rate of increase, F(1, 39)= 8.97,
MSE= 187.02, p, .01, h2p = .19. Simple effects
analysis revealed signiﬁcant effects of amount of
increase at both rates of increase. There was an
effect of rate of increase in accord with the main
effect at small increase, F(1, 39)= 26.56, MSE=
155.08, p, .001, h2p = .41, but not at large
increase, F(1, 39)= 0.17, MSE= 228.33.
The three-way interaction was also signiﬁcant,
F(3, 117)= 4.20, MSE= 194.49, p, .01,
h2p = .10. This qualiﬁes the interaction between
amount and rate of increase. The effect of rate of
increase is evident at early and on-time interven-
tion, except for the combination of on-time inter-
vention and large increase. This happens to be
the combination that received the highest mean
judgements (63.97 at shallow rate and 61.87 at
steep rate), so possibly participants judged that
rate of increase added nothing to what already
appeared to be a strong effect of intervention.
EXPERIMENT 3B
Method
The method of Experiment 3b was exactly the same
as that in Experiment 3a.
Result
Data were analysed with a 2 (timing of interven-
tion: early vs. on time)× 2 (amount of increase:
small vs. large)× 2 (postincrease phase: plateau
vs. decline) within-subjects ANOVA. Means are
reported in Table 3. In brief, there were signiﬁcant
effects of all three factors, which resembled those
found in Experiment 1b.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of timing of inter-
vention, F(1, 39)= 6.18, MSE= 691.41, p, .05,
h2p = .14, with a higher mean at on-time (42.79)
than at early intervention. There was a signiﬁcant
effect of amount of increase, F(1, 39)= 155.05,
MSE= 198.60, p, .001, h2p = .54, with a higher
mean at large (48.94) than at small (29.32).
There was a signiﬁcant effect of postincrease
phase, F(1, 39)= 28.13, MSE= 647.98,
p, .001, h2p = .42 , with a higher mean at
plateau (46.68) than at decline (31.59).
There was one other signiﬁcant result, an inter-
action between amount of increase and postincrease
phase, F(1, 39)= 7.38, MSE= 233.66, p, .01,
h2p = .16. This has the same pattern as the corre-
sponding interaction in Experiment 1b.
Discussion of Experiments 1, 2, and 3
There is general consistency between the results of
all three experiments. In all three, there were
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signiﬁcant and similar effects of timing of interven-
tion, amount of increase, and postincrease phase. A
main effect of rate of increase was found in
Experiments 1 and 3 but not in Experiment 2,
although a similar effect was found in Experiment
2 at midway intervention alone. An interaction
between amount of increase and postincrease
phase was found with a similar pattern in all three
experiments.
There are indications, however, that the con-
ditions peculiar to each experiment had some
effect on judgements. I have already observed that
the effects of timing of intervention varied to
some degree between Experiments 1 and 2,
although the variations could indicate the occur-
rence of a weak effect that does not always
reach statistical signiﬁcance. The results of
Experiment 3 agree with those of the earlier two
experiments in showing generally higher judge-
ments for early and on-time intervention than for
midway and late intervention. In Experiment 3,
however, the means for midway and late interven-
tion were substantially lower than those for early
and on-time intervention, and a higher proportion
of zero judgements occurred (see Tables 2 and 3).
This suggests that the graphical format draws
attention to the timing of the intervention in
relation to the changes in levels of cells more than
the numerical format does, and participants were
more likely to realize that an increase that began
before the intervention was unlikely to be the
cause of it. It is not clear why this would be less
likely to occur with the numerical format; this
would be an interesting issue for future research.
One further possibility is that the results could
be speciﬁc to the scenario, which was retained
across all three experiments. A replication of the
design of Experiment 1 has in fact been run
using a different scenario. Participants were told
that a gardener was trying to ﬁnd out whether a
fertilizer inﬂuenced the number of new leaves
that plants produced in a given amount of time.
The time scale was weeks instead of hours, but
the numerical information was in other respects
identical to that in Experiment 1. The results
showed some differences in the details of signiﬁ-
cant interactions, but the main effects that are
of central interest in this research were all repli-
cated. Of particular note, there was no signiﬁcant
difference between the means for the early and
midway interventions, though both were rated
signiﬁcantly lower than the on-time intervention.
Replication with two different scenarios is not
enough to conclude that there are no scenario-
speciﬁc effects, but it is consistent with that
possibility.
Mean judgements were generally higher in
Experiment 3 than in Experiments 1 and 2. To
illustrate, the highest mean judgement in
Experiment 1 was 37.5 (on-time timing, large
amount, steep rate), and the highest in
Experiment 3 was 64.0 (on-time timing, large
amount, shallow rate). Effect sizes were also gener-
ally larger in Experiment 3. To illustrate, the three
effect sizes for the main effects in Experiment 1a
were .28, .57, and .45; the corresponding effect
sizes in Experiment 3 were .78, .80, and .24. One
possible explanation is that participants in
Experiments 1 and 2 had relatively low conﬁdence
in their judgements, perhaps because of the
numerical format. In everyday life, time series
information is unlikely to be presented in numerical
format, but more likely to be an experience of
intensity (of pain, for example), or some kind of
visual information (e.g., from the gardening scen-
ario just mentioned, the visible appearance of
bushiness of a plant). Time series information is
not likely to be available in graphical form either,
but it is possible that graphical format is more
intuitively related to intensity than numerical
format is. In addition, the rise and fall of a line
on a graph is very easily detected in visual percep-
tion, whereas the rise and fall in a set of numbers
requires more deliberation and calculation to be
assessed. The increases in means and effect sizes
in Experiment 3 were not uniform, however. This
is illustrated by the effect size for the main effect
of rate of increase, which was .45 in Experiment
1a and .24 in Experiment 3a. This could be a
further indication that judgements were generated
by different processes, or it could indicate that the
relative salience of different features of the infor-
mation varies depending on presentation format.
Further research could shed more light on this.
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The after – before model
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 found effects of amount
and rate of increase that would not be surprising:
Higher causal judgements occurred for greater
than for lesser amounts of change, and for faster
than for slower change (although the latter was
not found in Experiment 2). The effect of
timing of intervention was less intuitive. In
Experiment 1a, the on-time intervention was not
rated signiﬁcantly higher than the early or
midway interventions. In Experiment 2a, the on-
time intervention was rated signiﬁcantly higher
than the midway intervention, though not signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the early intervention. In both
experiments, the midway intervention was consist-
ently endorsed as a cause even though a steady
incremental change had started before the inter-
vention was made. Even more strikingly, a large
proportion of participants made a nonzero judge-
ment of the cause even with late intervention, an
intervention made after the increase had stopped.
For example, in Experiment 1a, with late inter-
vention, large amount of increase and steep rate
of increase, 87% of participants responded “yes”
to the ﬁrst question. The participants appear to
have been judging that the intervention caused
an increase that had actually ﬁnished by the time
the intervention occurred. This was not found in
Experiment 3a: Mean ratings of both midway
and late intervention were much lower, and a
majority of participants responded “no” to the
ﬁrst question.
In fact, a simple model can predict the results of
Experiments 1 and 2 and most of the results of
Experiment 3. Take the mean postintervention
value and the mean preintervention value and sub-
tract the latter from the former. I refer to this as the
“after – before” model. Mean predicted values gen-
erated by this model for each of the main effects in
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are presented in Table 4,
along with the means found in the experiments.
Ordinal relations are of interest, not the absolute
values. The table shows that the model does
predict all the main effects in Experiments 1 and
2, except that it predicts a higher mean for
midway intervention than for early intervention.
The model also correctly predicts that the effect
of amount of increase should be greater than the
effect of rate of increase.
Most importantly, the model predicts the puz-
zling ﬁndings obtained for the midway and late
interventions. The relatively high mean rating for
the midway intervention is predicted by the
model, as Table 4 shows. In addition, the model
predicts an effect of amount of increase with late
intervention. The predicted values are 4.19 for
small and 7.95 for large. This difference is reﬂected
in the observed means of 4.27 for small and 16.61
for large. The model also predicts an effect of rate
of increase with late intervention, with means of
5.65 for shallow and 6.49 for steep. This difference
Table 4. Predictions of the after – before model and main effects for Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Experiment
I.V. Level 1 2 3 Predicted
Timing Early 22.39 29.96 39.11 6.25
On time 24.71 34.57 45.88 6.94
Midway 21.30 23.29 7.06 6.88
Late 10.44 11.74 3.19 6.07
Amount of increase Small 11.59 17.74 14.97 4.62
Large 27.83 32.04 32.65 8.45
Rate of increase Shallow 17.35 24.64 21.84 6.10
Steep 22.07 25.15 25.78 6.97
Postincrease Plateau 24.66 31.04 31.59 6.79
Decline 10.17 21.97 46.68 2.90
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was also found to be signiﬁcant. This is particularly
important because, on the surface, it appears as
though judgements of the causal efﬁcacy of the
late intervention were affected by changes that
occurred before the late intervention. If judgements
were made in accordance with the after – before
model, the effects really reﬂect the fact that the
differences between the mean outcome values
before and after the intervention are greater when
amount of increase is large than when it is small,
and when rate of increase is steep than when it is
shallow. This explains what would otherwise
appear to be a case of judged backwards causation,
a cause affecting something that occurred earlier in
time. It is possible that the ﬁnding is a genuine
instance of judged backwards causation, and that
a majority of participants did believe that the inter-
vention could cause something that happened
before it in time. However, the results of
Experiment 3 indicate that this is unlikely: There,
the means for the midway and late interventions
were close to zero. If participants really believed
in the possibility of backwards causation, it is unli-
kely that a mere change in presentation format
would induce them to refrain from making judge-
ments of that sort.
The main failing of the model is that it does not
predict the low means for the midway and late
interventions found in Experiment 3. This may
show either that the model is wrong or that some
other process is at work with the kind of graphical
presentation that was used in Experiment 3. This is
addressed in the general discussion. For now, the
after – before model at least provides a suitable
target, in that it is a parsimonious account that gen-
erates testable predictions. The remaining exper-
iments were designed to run further tests of the
model.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 was designed to test two predictions
of the after – before model. In the discussion of
Experiment 1a, I commented that an increase
from a low baseline mean was proportionately
greater than the same absolute size of increase
from a higher baseline mean. Participants might
therefore make higher causal judgements for pro-
portionately greater increases. The after – before
model, however, predicts no effect of this manipu-
lation because causal judgement depends only the
absolute difference between the post- and preinter-
vention means and should not, therefore, be
affected by changes in proportions in the absence
of changes in absolute differences. In addition,
the model predicts an effect of timing of onset
of the decline phase. The later the decline begins,
the higher causal judgement should be, because
the postintervention mean is higher when the
decline starts late than when it starts soon after
the intervention. To maintain methodological con-
sistency with Experiment 1, these manipulations
were set in a context of manipulations of timing
of intervention and amount of increase in the
increase phase.
Method
The method was similar to that of Experiment 1,
with the following differences. There were 40 par-
ticipants, none of whom had participated in the
previous experiments. Four variables were manipu-
lated. The basic design was similar to that of
Experiment 1b with a decline occurring in the post-
increase phase. The manipulated variables were the
baseline outcome magnitude, the timing of the
intervention, the amount of increase in the increase
phase, and the timing of onset of the decline.
Baseline outcome magnitude had two values,
means of 5.5 (low) and 15.5 (high). In each case,
baseline values differed by no more than one, as
in Experiment 1. Timing of intervention had two
values, early and on time, as in Experiment 1b.
The early intervention came in time period 3 and
the on-time intervention in time period 7.
Amount of increase was measured as the arith-
metical difference between the baseline mean and
the value at the end of the increase phase. This
took two values, 6.5 (12 – 5.5 in the low baseline
condition and 22 – 15.5 in the high baseline con-
dition; termed small), and 11.5 (17 – 5.5 in the
low baseline condition and 27 – 15.5 in the high
baseline condition; termed large). Timing of
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onset of the decline was manipulated with three
values, with decline starting in time period 13,
17, or 21. This yielded a total of 24 datasets. The
design is shown in Table 5.
Results
Data were analysed with a 2 (baseline mean: small
vs. large)× 2 (timing of intervention: early vs. on
Table 5. Datasets used in Experiment 4
Period l/s/13 l/s/17 l/s/21 l/l/13 l/l/17 l/l/21 h/s/13 h/s/17 h/s/21 h/l/13 h/l/17 h/l/21
1 6 6 6 6 6 6 16 16 16 16 16 16
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 15 15
3 6 6 6 6 6 6 16 16 16 16 16 16
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 15 15
5 6 6 6 6 6 6 16 16 16 16 16 16
6 5 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 15 15
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 17 17 17 17 17 17
8 8 8 8 9 9 9 18 18 18 19 19 19
9 9 9 9 11 11 11 19 19 19 21 21 21
10 10 10 10 13 13 13 20 20 20 23 23 23
11 11 11 11 15 15 15 21 21 21 25 25 25
12 12 12 12 17 17 17 22 22 22 27 27 27
13 11 11 11 15 15 15 21 21 21 25 25 25
14 10 12 12 13 17 17 20 22 22 23 27 27
15 9 11 11 11 15 15 19 21 21 21 25 25
16 8 12 12 9 17 17 18 22 22 19 27 27
17 7 11 11 7 15 15 17 21 21 17 25 25
18 6 10 12 6 13 17 16 20 22 16 23 27
19 5 9 11 5 11 15 15 19 21 15 21 25
20 6 8 12 6 9 17 16 18 22 16 19 27
21 5 7 11 5 7 15 15 17 21 15 17 25
22 6 6 10 6 6 13 16 16 20 16 16 23
23 5 5 9 5 5 11 15 15 19 15 15 21
24 6 6 8 6 6 9 16 16 18 16 16 19
Note: Columns are identiﬁed by independent variables in the order baseline mean/magnitude/decline onset. For baseline mean, “l”=
low and “h”= high. For magnitude, “s”= small and “l”= large. For decline onset, number indicates the time period in which the
decline starts (13, 17, or 21).
Table 6. Mean causal judgements and numbers of participants responding “yes” to Question 1, Experiment 4
Decline onset
Baseline Timing Magnitude 13 17 21
Low Early Small 9.15 (21) 18.45 (32) 22.72 (32)
Large 18.22 (29) 27.02 (34) 32.05 (36)
On time Small 15.05 (30) 20.45 (31) 24.52 (36)
Large 25.62 (37) 34.20 (40) 35.57 (39)
High Early Small 8.82 (20) 15.72 (28) 18.80 (34)
Large 24.72 (35) 32.67 (37) 32.95 (38)
On time Small 13.15 (27) 17.12 (33) 22.87 (34)
Large 24.37 (34) 31.75 (38) 43.55 (40)
Note: Numbers in brackets are numbers of participants responding “yes” to Question 1 (n= 40).
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time)× 2 (amount of increase: small vs. large)× 3
(decline onset: time period 13 vs. 17 vs. 21)
within-subjects ANOVA. Means are reported in
Table 6.
The results showed a clear effect of decline
onset: The later the decline started, the higher the
mean judgement was. For this effect, F(2, 78)=
32.01, MSE= 350.93, p, .001, h2p = .45. Post
hoc paired comparisons revealed the order 21
(29.13). 17 (24.67). 13 (17.39). There was no
signiﬁcant effect of baseline mean, F(1, 39)=
0.04, MSE= 435.69.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of timing of inter-
vention, F(1, 39)= 14.16, MSE= 259.46,
p, .001, h2p = .27, with a higher mean for on
time (25.69) than for early (21.77).
There was a signiﬁcant effect of amount of
increase, F(1, 39)= 80.39, MSE= 503.57,
p, .001, h2p = .67, with a higher mean for large
(30.22) than for small (17.24). This was qualiﬁed
by a signiﬁcant interaction with baseline mean,
F(1, 39)= 15.80, MSE= 102.37, p, .001,
h2p = .29. Surprisingly for such a high F ratio,
simple effects analysis shed little further light on
this, because there was no signiﬁcant effect of base-
line mean at either large or small amount of
increase. The range of means was greater for large
than for small amount of increase, but this was
not really reﬂected in either the respective F ratios
or the effect sizes. For small, F(1, 39)= 65.04,
MSE= 199.24, p, .001, h2p = .63, and for large,
F(1, 39)= 71.65, MSE= 71.65, p, .001,
h2p = .65. There were no other signiﬁcant results.
Discussion
The results supported the predictions of the after –
before model. There was, as predicted, no signiﬁ-
cant effect of baseline mean. This indicates that
causal judgements are affected by absolute but not
by proportional differences between pre- and post-
intervention means. There was a strong effect of
timing of decline onset: As predicted, the later
the decline started, the higher the mean causal jud-
gement was. In addition, there were effects of
timing of intervention and amount of increase
that replicated those found in Experiment 1.
If people are computing unweighted means, this
implies that they will be insensitive to the amount
of time that passes after the intervention before a
noticeable change occurs on the outcome
measure. At the extreme, it would make no differ-
ence whether a given change occurred minutes or
weeks after the intervention. This seems unlikely.
While the exact effect of this temporal relation
may depend on scenario-speciﬁc beliefs, or on
cues to the duration of mechanisms connecting
cause and outcome (Bühner & McGregor, 2006),
it is likely that temporal contiguity matters, and
that changes temporally proximal to the interven-
tion will elicit higher causal judgements than
changes more distal from it.
Experiment 5 was designed to test this by pre-
senting a pattern of readings all at the same value
but interrupted by a brief but readily noticeable
change, which I call a “blip”: a brief, sharp rise in
the outcome value followed by an equally brief fall
to the baseline value. This pattern of change
could occur at any time after the intervention. If
causal judgements are derived from unweighted
means, that implies that the timing of the blip in
relation to the intervention is irrelevant so long as
the postintervention mean does not vary. On the
other hand, if causal judgements are inﬂuenced by
temporal contiguity, there should be higher causal
judgements for blips that occur soon after the inter-
vention than for blips that occur later.
EXPERIMENT 5
Method
Details of method were mostly the same as those
for Experiment 1. There were 120 participants,
none of whom had taken part in the previous exper-
iments. There was one independent variable,
timing of the blip, which was a between-subjects
variable with three conditions, each with 40 partici-
pants. Apart from the blip, all observations, both
pre- and postintervention, showed a value of 40.
The blip comprised an increase by 8 per time
period for three time periods, culminating in a
maximum value of 64, immediately followed by a
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decrease by 8 per time period back to the baseline
value of 40. The intervention occurred after time
period 8 in all three conditions. In the “early blip”
condition, the blip began in time period 9, in the
“middle blip” condition it began in time period
14, and in the “late blip” condition it began in
time period 19. An example stimulus presentation
is shown in the Appendix; that is the middle blip
condition.
Results and discussion
Data were analysed with one-way ANOVA, and a
signiﬁcant result was found, F(2, 117)= 5.01,
MSE= 208.58, p, .01, h2p = .08. Post hoc
paired comparisons with the Tukey test revealed
that the mean for the early blip (18.70) was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than those for the middle (10.17) and
late blips (9.55), which did not differ signiﬁcantly.
The result therefore shows an effect of temporal
contiguity, with higher causal judgements for the
blip that was temporally contiguous with the inter-
vention than for the blips that occurred after a
delay. This indicates that a simple unweighted
mean difference between pre- and postintervention
values is not adequate as an account of causal judge-
ments about time series.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research used a novel kind of presentation of
stimulus information for causal judgement, taking
the form of an individual case history with values
of an outcome variable over a series of time
periods combined with information about an inter-
vention. Participants judged the extent to which the
intervention caused an increase in value on the
outcome variable. This format was designed to
reﬂect some features that characterize information
commonly available for causal judgement outside
the laboratory, particularly the sample of one, the
lack of any control or comparison group, and data
about change over time. Some unusual results
occurred: Principally, with numerical stimulus
information, participants tended to judge that the
intervention caused an increase even when an
increase preceded the intervention and stopped at
the time of the intervention. Causal judgements
appeared to be inﬂuenced by several factors, includ-
ing the amount of increase in the increase phase,
the rate at which the increase occurred, and the
timing of the intervention in relation to the increase
phase. However, most of the results are predicted
by a simple model in which causal judgement is
generated by subtracting the preintervention
mean from the postintervention mean. This
suggests that participants are not operating with
speciﬁc beliefs about what amount of increase,
rate of increase, and the relation between change
in the outcome value and the time at which the
intervention occurs imply for causal judgement.
Instead, they judge the efﬁcacy of the intervention
just from the difference between the values
observed before and after the intervention, and
the effects of the manipulated variables emerge
from that.
There are, however, two results that are not pre-
dicted by the after – before model. Experiment 5
found evidence for an effect of temporal contiguity,
in that higher judgements were found for a change
that occurred immediately after the intervention
than for changes that occurred later. As it stands,
the after – before model makes no reference to tem-
poral factors other than the division of the stimulus
information into the periods before and after the
intervention. This is likely to be an oversimpliﬁca-
tion, at best. The stimulus information used in this
research has a limited span of 24 time periods,
which are deﬁned as hours in the scenario. The
results of Experiment 5 indicate that these time
periods are not equally weighted in computation
of the after – before difference, and this is consist-
ent with research showing that temporal contiguity
is an important factor in causal judgement (e.g.,
Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Michotte, 1963;
Schlottmann, 1999; Shanks, Pearson, &
Dickinson, 1989; but see also Bühner &
McGregor, 2006). This implies that information
about times more distal from the intervention,
either before or after, would tend to carry progress-
ively less weight in the computation, depending on
the role of the judge’s expectations about delay in
occurrence of outcomes of interventions (Bühner
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& McGregor, 2006). Eventually (and again
depending on expectations) there would come a
point where information carried zero weight
because it was too far away from the intervention
in time. The after – before model can be modiﬁed
to account for the result of Experiment 5 by adding
a weighting component, such that the postinter-
vention mean is computed on observed values
each multiplied by some weighting factor, with
weights being maximal immediately after the inter-
vention and declining thereafter. That would be a
mere empirical ﬁx, however, The ﬁnding shows
that more than just integration of pre- and postin-
tervention observations is involved in judgement,
and it is likely that the ﬁnding reﬂects a general
belief about temporal contiguity in causal processes.
Further research on the way this is affected by scen-
ario content factors, as in the study by Bühner and
McGregor (2006) would be enlightening.
The second problematic result comes from
Experiment 3, where the midway and late interven-
tions received much lower judgements than the
early and on-time interventions, which is not pre-
dicted by the model. Experiment 3 differed from
the others in using graphical presentation instead
of numerical presentation. It is likely that the
result reﬂects a different approach to judgement
with graphical information. One possibility is that
different features of the stimulus information
differ in salience between the two formats. It may
be more obvious, with graphical presentation, that
a steady increase has commenced before the
midway intervention and that the rate of increase
does not change after it. It is not clear why this
should not be obvious with the numerical format,
but if participants were treating preintervention
and postintervention readings as separate blocks,
then they may not have attended to the temporal
dimension of change in relation to the timing of
the intervention. Thus, even though the other
results of Experiment 3 were predicted by the
after – before model, it is likely that the low
ratings of the midway intervention indicate that a
different kind of process was involved, and that
the after – before model does not ﬁt. It is also poss-
ible that the same basic process operated, but that
different kinds of information were weighted
differently because of differences in attentive pro-
cessing of the stimuli. Further research on the
graphical presentation format should shed more
light on this.
Normative causal judgement and practicality
One reason for investigating how causal judge-
ments are made with contingency information
about binary variables is that there are normative
models of causal inference from such information,
and the predictions of the normative models can
be compared with observed judgemental tendencies
(Bühner, Cheng, & Clifford, 2003). There can be
no normative analysis of causality for the kind of
information presented here, because it does not
satisfy basic principles of experimental design
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). There is just a sample
of one and no control group.
There are normative analyses of interrupted time
series data (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008;
Chatﬁeld, 2004; McCain & McCleary, 1979),
and there are several inferential techniques for
deriving information such as effect size (e.g.
Maggin et al., 2011; Parker, Hagan-Burke, &
Vannest, 2007). Recently, Bayesian hypothesis
testing methods have been developed for single
subject designs (De Vries & Morey, 2013). The
basic principle of Bayesian analysis is the rational
modiﬁcation of belief in the light of new evidence.
Thus, the issue addressed by De Vries and Morey
(2013) is the quantiﬁcation of “the extent to
which the data support the null hypothesis over
the alternative hypothesis” (p. 168). This in turn
can be regarded as indicating “the extent to which
a rational person should adjust their beliefs,
expressed in rational odds, in favour of the null
hypothesis in response to the data” (p. 169). This,
they argue, gives the Bayesian approach an advan-
tage over traditional inferential statistics.
Be that as it may, all inferential tests rest on
assumptions. De Vries and Morey (2013) noted
that one of the assumptions of their method is
that the observations that gave rise to the data
were independent. This assumption is never met
in time series data with a single subject because
the process of observation itself can affect
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subsequent readings, and of course successive read-
ings may concern a process that unfolds continu-
ously over the time series. No causal inference
from interrupted time series data can ever be
justiﬁed, not just because of the requirement of
independent observations, but because of methodo-
logical shortcomings inherent in the interrupted
time series design. The lack of a control group is
an obvious example, and it means that the
possibility of covert causal mechanisms that are
correlated with the intervention cannot be ruled
out. Cook and Campbell (1979) pointed out, for
example, that causal inference from individual
time series data is compromised by the possibility
of cyclical processes such as those linked to time
of day. A control condition would be the
minimum requirement for dealing with this
problem. The Bayesian approach could quantify
the change in likelihood that the causal hypothesis
is correct, but could never conﬁrm a causal hypoth-
esis, and the quantiﬁcation would depend on how
the methodological inadequacies of the design
were taken into account.
Although it is not possible to specify what would
be the right causal inference from time series data,
it is possible to specify some causal inferences that
would certainly be wrong. Judgement that the
intervention causes an increase in the outcome
variable when it occurs at the end of a change in
the value of that variable, as was found in
Experiment 1, is one of them. Whatever normative
principles of causal inference might hold for data in
the form of a time series, the causal judgements
found in this research clearly do not conform to
them.
Experiments 1 and 2 found that high pro-
portions of participants made nonzero causal judge-
ments about interventions that occurred after the
increase phase had ended. It is difﬁcult for any
model in which human causal judgement is rep-
resented as normative to account for this because
it would be incorrect, unless backwards causation
really occurs. The only way for a normative
account to deal with this result would be to show
that participants reinterpreted the judgemental
task in some way. For example, they might have
opted to judge the extent to which the intervention
was responsible for maintaining a high level on the
outcome variable. This possibility cannot be ruled
out on the basis of the present data, but it appears
unlikely. First, a “maintenance” judgement is not
compatible with the wording of the dependent
measure, which explicitly asked participants to
judge the extent to which the intervention caused
an increase. Second, it does not explain why partici-
pants in Experiment 3 did not (with very few
exceptions, shown in Table 2) give nonzero judge-
ments for the late intervention: The wording of the
judgement question was the same in Experiments 1
and 3, so it is not clear why participants would
adopt a “maintenance” interpretation in
Experiment 1 and not in Experiment 3. Third, it
is not likely that people generally operate with a
“maintenance” conceptualization of causality: the
common assumption would be that things stay as
they are unless acted on by a cause, which is con-
trary to the “maintenance” interpretation. Indeed,
for exactly that reason it is not clear that a “main-
tenance” interpretation of causality could be
defended on normative grounds. Hopefully
further research investigating how people interpret
the causal question will settle the matter.
Is human causal judgement adapted for metho-
dologically ideal information or for practically
obtainable information? I would argue for the
latter. The conditions of life outside the laboratory
rarely if ever satisfy basic methodological require-
ments. It may be possible to compare one group
of observations with another, but it is not likely
that the observations could be obtained under the
controlled conditions required for valid causal
inference. If I want to make a causal judgement
about something to do with myself, such as recov-
ery from a back injury, I cannot run a control con-
dition in which I live a life that is exactly the same
except for the absence of a hypothesized cause.
Causal judgement must therefore be adapted (if at
all) to conditions that prevail in the world because
there is often a practical need to make causal judge-
ments when information in normatively appropri-
ate forms is not available. It is probably better to
make causal inferences from methodologically
inadequate information than to refrain from
doing so, so long as the value or quantity of true
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positives outweighs that of false positives. One way
of improving the ratio of these would be to rely on
multiple cues. Quantitative cues such as outcome
magnitude and slope of incremental change could
be combined with other relevant cues such as cues
to mechanisms (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman,
1995), generative transmission cues (Shultz,
1982), and contiguity.
Associative learning models
Models of associative learning have often been
applied to human causal judgement (De Houwer
& Beckers, 2002), and a test of one of them, the
Rescorla–Wagner (R–W) model (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972) did much to stimulate research
into human causal judgement from contingency
information (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden,
1984). In application to human causal judgement,
a possible cause is treated as a cue, and causal jud-
gement reﬂects the strength of an associative bond
between the cause and the outcome at the time of
judgement. The bond tends to be strengthened
by instances in which cue and outcome are both
present and is weakened by instances in which
the cue is present but the outcome does not occur.
The model holds for situations in which infor-
mation is presented sequentially, in a series of
learning trials. It might be thought, therefore,
that the present format is well suited to the
model. However, the problem is that all the stimu-
lus information is available to the participant at the
same time. Thus, the participant could generate a
judgement by scanning back and forth through
the information, computing means, adding, and
subtracting, all facilitated by the presence of the
entire dataset for judgement. This reasoning does
suggest that the after – before model may be
speciﬁc to the situation in which all the information
is simultaneously available to the participant, and
that it may be difﬁcult or impossible to execute
the computations required by the model when
only one trial is available at a time. Investigating
whether the after – before model predicts judge-
ments when information is presented sequentially,
and only one trial is before the participant’s eyes
at any one time, should therefore be a priority for
future research, and in that situation the predictions
generated by associative learning models could also
be validly tested.
Issues and future directions
This ﬁrst foray into causal judgements about infor-
mation conforming to a simple interrupted time
series design raises many issues for further work.
Variance in the data was deliberately kept low in
these experiments. The object was to ascertain the
judgemental tendencies that would occur when
the empirical data were unambiguous. That is,
there should be clear demarcations between the
baseline, increase, and postincrease phases.
Participants were asked to judge whether the inter-
vention caused an increase on the outcome variable,
so it was important that the onset and offset of the
increase be readily apparent in the materials. In
addition, the increase phase was designed to show
an incremental change, and the incremental
nature of the change could be obscured if the var-
iance in the data were increased. The mean value
in the increase phase can be ascertained regardless
of the amount of variance in the data, but it was
thought that the occurrence of an incremental
change might be more important than the mean
during that phase. Variance is likely to be relevant,
however, because, with a limited number of obser-
vations in each phase, detecting differences or
changes is likely to be rendered more difﬁcult by
increasing variance in the data. Research on the
applicability of signal detection theory to causal
judgement with binary variables (Allan, Hannah,
Crump, & Siegel, 2008) indicates that there may
be much to learn from further investigation in
this direction.
One of the methodological drawbacks with the
interrupted time series design is the lack of a
control group. It could be argued, however, that
participants in these studies did have access to
control group data because the manipulations
were all within subject. Thus, they could compare
one dataset with another. The instructions explicitly
stated that each dataset concerned a different kind
of cell, a different kind of chemical, and a different
patient. Each was given a code identiﬁcation at the
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top of each dataset as a reminder that they were all
different. It should have been clear to anyone cogni-
sant of the need for a control group that the differ-
ent datasets did not constitute control groups for
each other. Using one dataset as a control for
another would be like judging the effect of apples
on liver function in one patient by comparing the
data for that with data about the effect of oranges
on heart rate in another patient: It would make no
sense. If participants felt the need for control data,
however, they might resort to other datasets in des-
peration. If that were the case, the results might
show greater reluctance to endorse the “yes”
response for the ﬁrst dataset encountered than for
later datasets, because for the ﬁrst dataset no
control data are yet available. I checked this for
the data from Experiment 4. There were 28 “yes”
responses to the ﬁrst dataset, compared to a mean
for all datasets of 25.75. The correlation between
number of “yes” responses and ordinal position of
dataset was –.24, p= .3. There is therefore no evi-
dence that participants felt the need of control
data before they were willing to endorse the causal
hypothesis. Experiment 5 used a between-subjects
design, so there was no opportunity for participants
to use any other dataset as a control for the one
being judged. Despite this, in the condition with
the highest mean causal judgement, the early blip
condition, 32 out of 40 participants (80%) gave a
nonzero judgement. So the results give no indi-
cation that participants either used available data-
sets as control sets, or felt handicapped by the lack
of alternative data.
I have made the point that there is no control
condition with an interrupted time series design,
but it could be argued that the baseline (preinter-
vention) period is the control condition.
However, comparison between preintervention as
a control condition and postintervention as an
experimental condition is only valid if nothing
else changes in a way that is temporally correlated
with the shift from preintervention to postinterven-
tion phase. The only way to ensure that this con-
dition is met would be within the conﬁnes of a
laboratory where all conditions can be held constant
for the duration of the observations. Even then, in
the case of a physiological scenario, it would be
impossible to ascertain whether any physiological
factors change in a way that is independent of but
temporally correlated with the intervention. Cook
and Campbell (1979) gave circadian rhythms as
an example. Under the circumstances of everyday
life, where control of variables is all but impossible,
causal inferences from interrupted time series
designs can never be justiﬁed.
The scenarios used in the present studies were
designed to minimize the impact of preexisting
causal beliefs by using unidentiﬁable cells and
chemicals. It is nevertheless possible that judge-
ments could have been inﬂuenced by causal knowl-
edge in the form of expectations, either about the
course of events in the increase phase given a
certain pattern in the baseline phase, or about
what would have happened in the postincrease
phase if the intervention had not occurred. Causal
judgements could then be inﬂuenced by assessment
of the way in which the observed tendency deviated
from the expected tendency. In the present research
there is no information about participants’ expec-
tations. It is reasonable to suppose that participants
would expect an apparently stable series of baseline
measurements to continue in the absence of an
intervention. What do they expect, however, if
there is an increase phase prior to the intervention?
This is more problematic. They are asked to judge
the likelihood that the intervention causes an
increase on the outcome variable. This appears to
require that they judge, at the very least, that the
postintervention observations are higher than they
were expected to be in the absence of the interven-
tion. If the increase is followed by a plateau, and the
intervention occurs at the point where the increase
levels off, endorsing “yes” must mean that the
participant had an expectation that the increase
would have reversed at that point if the intervention
had not occurred. Since there is no sign of anything
other than a steady increase in the periods leading
up to the intervention, there is no reason for any
participant to hold this expectation. Nevertheless
it is possible to test the hypothesis by asking partici-
pants to extrapolate the readings they would expect
to occur if the intervention had not been made.
This might enable a discriminative test of this
hypothesis and the after – before model.
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A colleague objected that, because the partici-
pants were undergraduate students participating
in return for course credit, they would adopt the
easiest method of making the judgements. The
problem with this is that there is no objective deﬁ-
nition of easiness. Consider an analogy. If I am
asked to solve 5+ 7, then if I am experienced
with mental arithmetic but have never used a
pocket calculator before, mental arithmetic is
easiest for me, and I would prefer to use that
method to solve the problem. If I am used to
using a pocket calculator but have never learned
mental arithmetic, the calculator is the easier
method for me, and I would preferentially use
that. Thus, easiness can be deﬁned in terms of
whatever process is most natural for the person con-
cerned. If the participants wanted to choose the
easiest method and chose to compute the mean
difference, that implies that that is indeed the
easiest method for them, and it is easiest because
it is the one with which they have had most prac-
tice. If they were more used to detecting trends
and comparing the trends before and after the
intervention, that would be the easiest method for
them, and they would do that. So it can be
argued that, even if the participants were opting
for the easiest method, that is an indicator of
which kind of judgemental process is most used
by them.
The stimulus presentation format used in the
present research was the simple interrupted time
series design. There are many other quasiexperi-
mental designs (Cook & Campbell, 1979), and it
is likely that causally relevant information that is
available to nonscientists often conforms to one
or another of these. It is therefore important
to investigate judgements made from stimulus pre-
sentations conforming to other kinds of quasiex-
perimental design and to investigate whether the
after – before model is capable of predicting the
results. Cook and Campbell (1979) argued that
some quasiexperimental designs have a better
claim to supporting causal inferences than others.
It is likely that no causal inference from data con-
forming to a quasiexperimental design can be
absolutely lacking in uncertainty; the arguments
made by Cook and Campbell seem to focus
mainly on reducing the likelihood of alternative
explanations rather than eliminating them
altogether. Nevertheless it would be important to
investigate whether causal inferences are made
with more conﬁdence from some designs than
from others, showing an intuitive appreciation of
methodological issues relevant to causal inference.
It is possible that the low causal ratings obtained
in the present research reﬂect, in part, intuitive jud-
gement of the limited value of the simple inter-
rupted time series design for purposes of causal
inference. If so, then higher ratings could be
obtained from data conforming to more rigorous
designs, such as designs in which appropriate
control group data were available.
Outcomes don’t just occur; they occur with a
certain magnitude. Viewed from this perspective,
the stimuli in causal judgement studies tend to be
abstract or described: The participant is simply
told that an outcome occurred or did not, and the
magnitude information that would be available if
a real outcome was encountered is missing.
Further research on the way in which causal judge-
ment is affected by outcome magnitude infor-
mation is therefore important. The abstract
nature of contingency information about binary
variables typically presented in experiments makes
it unrepresentative of causally relevant information
typically encountered in the world, not just because
of methodological considerations but also because
of the absence of magnitude information. Yet the
bulk of research on human causal judgement has
used that kind of abstract, unrepresentative infor-
mation. Investigating how causal judgement
relates to outcome magnitude information, particu-
larly in forms of information more likely to be avail-
able in the world, would give a different and
arguably more faithful insight into how humans
identify and judge the causes of outcomes that
matter to them.
The present research is just a ﬁrst step for this
particular kind of causal judgement, but the
after – before model can at least be a useful target
for further attempts at disconﬁrmation. If these
results do reﬂect real-world tendencies in causal
judgement from time series information, then it
seems likely that many causal beliefs are acquired
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in non-normative ways from methodologically
ﬂawed information.
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APPENDIX
Example stimulus presentation, Experiment 5
Chemical: RF Cell: EJ Patient: 219
Hour Level
1 40
2 40
3 40
4 40
5 40
6 40
7 40
8 40
CHEMICAL INJECTED HERE
9 40
10 40
11 40
12 40
13 40
14 48
15 56
16 64
17 56
18 48
19 40
20 40
21 40
22 40
23 40
24 40
Does chemical RF cause an increase in the level of EJ cells in the patient 219’s
blood or not? Write yes or no here:
If you said yes to the previous question, please rate how strong a cause of increase in
the level of EJ cells in patient 219’s blood chemical RF is:
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